The second Tannenberg was naturally and generally called the
Battle of Tannenberg.
Russians finished to mobilise two armies on the fifteenth
day(M15). These two approached the border of East Prussia. First
Army headed by Rennenkampf was attacking to the East and Second
by Samsonov was to the South. In order to adjust two armies the
North Eastern Army headquarters was established under the command
of Jilinsky who had been chief of staff for General Kurobatkin
at the time of the Battle of Mukden.
Russian strategy was based upon pincer movement. They have
traditionally liked this idea but the area in question is 150km
as perimeter from Danzig to Masurian Lakes and counted for 10days
distance on infantry foot. Furthermore, the concentration area
for deployment of 2nd Army (Samsonv) is 6days distance on river
Narew. Russian two armies were so far away with each other that
it was not easy to make a successful rendezvous on the same day
and area.
Russians made pincer movement successfully in the Siege Battle
of Berlin in the final phase of WW2. However, in WW1 the mobility
was so slow that we can not equate both and French Joffre once
told that East Prussia herself was an ambush as an area.
East Prussia has Masurian Lakes as natural moats so that Russians
divided two armies up, one for the East and another for the South.
It has still been discussed whether to divide on even and whether
to start at the same time.
1st Army(Rennenkampf) crossed the border faster on 17, August.
On the other hand, Germans put only one army called 8th with
four corps and half in East Prussia where the First Sovereign
of Prussia Kingdom was enthroned. Commander in chief was von
Prittwitz und Gaffron who worked for Kaiser Wilhelm as court
army staff. His skill is to talk about salacious topics with
abundant gossips and he was rumoured to promote rapidly as a
result. Chief of general staff, Moltke regarded him as incompetent.
Lone 8th Army was to take retreat tactics imposed on Schlieffen
Plan. When Russians actually invaded East Prussia and Cossacks
rampaged freely it is impossible for any good Germans to withdraw
from there. There had never been any battles in East Prussia
as well for almost one hundred years. People's skin-feeling was
not fit with a paper plan made in advance. Germans except von
Prittwitz made their minds up to defend East Prussia to the end.
8th Army seemed not to cope with one Russian army with full five
corps. It was a question rather to be discussed because East
Prussia was their own territory so that reserve battalions for
supplement and territorial brigades situated in fortresses were
available on occasion. In this light, if 8th Army in total hit
one Russian army Germans were advantageous.
8th Army's regular formation was as follows.
1st corps : von Francois
17th corps : von Mackenzen
1st reserve corps : von Below
20th corps : von Scholtz
3rd reserve division : von Morgen
Chief of staff was von Waldersee. The battle of Gumbinenn
took place on 20, August after all Russian 1st Army (Rennenkampf)
crossed the border. But commanders of both sides did not expect
it.
The Battle of Gumbinnen
The first idea of the retreat operation plan was to canalise
Russian 1st Army to Angerapp defence line and strike it in full
power except 20th corps(Scholtz). At least for 6 days 20th corps
had lonely to defend against Russian 2nd Army till the rest came
to succour.
The opposite side, Russians had more aggressive an operational
plan. They expected Germans to attack 1st Army first in full
strength but for the time being 2nd could advance giving a threat
in the centre of East Prussia. As a result, Germans should retreat
and on the halfway between the uppermost east and Danzig, probably
around Allenstein meet both armies resulting in completion of
pincer movement.
According to the German original plan they could take an initiative
at least for the time beginning.. There was an internal hazard,
General von Francois, commander of 1st corps who had Huguenot
ancestor but a convinced Junker born in East Prussia. All recruited
soldiers of 1st Army were born Prussians and had burning desire
to keep their homeland safe.
As soon as the news of Russian invasion 1st corps of von Francois
rushed out though he received the order to stand to the extreme
left. He kept his virtue, disobedience throughout Tannenberg
and seemed to some people to be a jolly comrade.
He ignored the prepared defensive line, Angerapp and reached
Stallupoenen, 8km inside of the border and terribly gunfired
the right wing of Russian 1st Army. Taken by surprise, Russian
27th division of 3rd corps dropped into chaos, fled away outside
the border and left 3000 prisoners.
Von Prittwitz was not happy to hear the attack of von Francis.
He was really upset to order the stop of the attack and to retreat
to the ordered position. Von Francis blurted to the dispatched
officer,"Tell General von Prittwitz that General von Francis
does not retreat while an enemy soldier steps in our fatherland."
However, night fell and with no friendly soldiers near by
von Francois retreated to Gumbinnen. Renennkampf regarded this
action as withdrawal. He failed to see von Francois's attack
as a result of disobedience and overestimated the strength of
the attacking corps.
Rennenkampf ordered two days march and halt at Gumbinnen 20km
away. He intended not to lose an opportunity for pincer movement
by pursuing Germans into depth.
At that time the important factor suddenly interrupted this
affair. Germans also took this order.
The order to halt was sent in clear by wireless. According to
Falkenhayn, chief of general staff later Germans intercepted
and decoded all of Russian Military wireless until late 1915.
It was devastating to Russians like Japanese during WW2.
During and after WW1the functional illiteracy rate of soldiers
and non-commissioned officers influenced to the extent which
literate soldiers easily defeated the cannot if being on the
same condition. We can find this tendency also in Russo-Japanese
War. This rate is reflected in compulsory education of each country.
The functional illiteracy rate of Russia, Austria=Hungary or
Italy is higher than one of any Western European countries. In
accurate statistics in Austria=Hungary most of subjects of Germans
Czechs and Hungarian could read and write a language of their
own. But as a result Austrian officers should be asked to speak
eleven or more languages.
Russian runners could not read and not understand which document
was more important and which document was necessarily kept confidential.
Russian generals resorted to send it by wireless in clear or
simple code.
Given this information von Prittwitz faced a difficult question
with alternatives. If he did not move from Angerapp line Russian
2nd army threaten the backside of his defence line. It is rather
better for him that Russian 1st move quickly giving a chance
enough to destroy and time to meet 2nd. Without time and advise
he decided to attack next morning against resting Russians at
Gumbinnen.
General von Francois was happy to hear that because his corps
was nearest Gumbinnen with enough geographical knowledge. Before
dawn he attacked the extreme right of Russian 1st with terrible
gun fire. Russians were broken into piece running away to the
border almost in rout.
However, the rest of German corps experienced different stories
paying their prices. 17th corps (Mackenzen) left Angerapp line
shortly after dawn advanced slowly and contacted with the enemy
around 8 o'clock. Given an enough warning from von Francois all
Russian troops had kept defence posture with their guns focused
to coming Germans. They gunfired at a first sight. 17th corps
was in the centre and crossed by all Russian guns. In this turn
Germans were crushed suffering 9000 loss.
Mackenzen himself escaped and retreated 20km by car. The rest
of 1st reserve corps and 3rd reserve division also lost fighting
spirit while seeing 17th corps retreating. On the other hand
Francois continued to push forward toward the right wing but
the distance to main body had got separated. In the afternoon
he also decided to retreat to Koenigsberg. Around 3 o'clock no
Russians pursued furthermore and the battle was appeared to end
up.
The battle of Gumbinnen was Russian triumph. Prittwitz panicked
and decided to retreat to River Vistula abandoning East Prussia
and worrying about following Russians. He asked von Moltke for
permission to retreat.
Von Moltke got crazy to hear that regretting his failure not
to replace him beforehand. While excusing himself to be against
military order he asked for advise of each commander of corps
level. The first comment came from von Francois saying that he
was a real winner. Von Mackenzen also denied defeat because Russians
did not pursue. The rest of commanders also told clearly that
the battle was not finished.
Gathering field commanders' comments von Moltke made a decision
to remove von Prittwitz. He asked Ludendorff who was a hero of
Liege to come to the headquarters in Coblenz in the evening of
21, August.
Hoffman
During this trouble Hoffman, operation staff got contact with
headquarters to make a new plan facing the possible withdrawal.
His idea was to bring all available forces to the South to face
invading Russian 2nd Army denying withdrawal. Without clear authorisation
he brought about already mobilised fortress garrisons, 70th mixed
territorial brigade and Ungel brigade to succour 20th corps.
It might be possible for an officer of German staff to authorise
without adequate authorisation process to change the mission
of troops under command like old Japanese Imperial Army.
He also had an idea to deploy 1st corps in the position next
to 20th corps by train while getting off at Deutsche Eylau and
also 3rd reserve division by train off at Allenstein. He thought
of using 20th corps and 1st reserve corps as strategic reserve
forces.
This idea was based on the new tactics of railway age using
rail for inner line. He thought that an improvised railway diagram
allowed any German troops to move quickly. His plan proved to
be effective resulting in one of greatest victories in the world
history.
In Coblenz von Motke gave a brief summary on East Prussia
to Ludendorff spending only three hours out of evening of 22,
August. However, according to German tradition Ludendorff did
not have enough stars on shoulder straps so that retired von
Hindenburg was suddenly called up to occupy the position of commander
of 8th Army. With pleasant consent from von Hindenburg a special
train was set up to carry both generals to Marienburg, the location
of 8th Army headquarters. 
Hindenburg
Ludendorff, not knowing anything about von Hindenburg met
him at Hannover station for the first time. The relationship
was to continue until the total defeat of German Empire. But
then, Ludendorff had to hear his new boss's complaints of old
dark blue uniform throughout train to Marienburg.
They arrived at the headquarters of 8th Army in the afternoon
of 23, August. The great battle of Tannenberg had already begun.
They gave permissions to new missions allotted by Hoffman. Ludendorff
also decided to bring all garrisons in fortresses to the prospective
battle field. 5th mixed territorial brigade, 6th mixed territorial
brigade and Goltz territorial division were organised contributing
one and half divisions in total.
Out of these, 6th mixed territorial brigade was consist of
garrisons at Loetzen Fortress so that they had to march from
front to rear. In order to defend against Russian 1st Army Ludendorff
put one cavalry division for screen and Koenigsberg garrisons
to defend the city.
The Battle of Tannenberg
Stone monument of the old battle of Tannenberg(1410).
German knights were defeated by joint army between Litowanian
and Polish. Barbed wire before the stone was in those days of
twentieth century.
Russian 2nd Army invaded taking north-western direction with
25km width toward Allenstein. On 23, August 20th corps, Ungel
brigade and 70th mixed territorial brigade were in alert along
Hohenstein-Neidenburg line.
Geographically, this defending area is almost flat scattered
with lakes. Some roads were cut by lakes and occasionally surrounded
by woods. The rest was covered by rye or potato fields.
Samsonov
Formation of 2nd Army lead by Samsonv was as follows.
6th corps : Blagovestchensky
13th corps : Kliouev
15th corps : Martos
23th corps : Kondratowitch
1st corps : Artomonov
6th corps occupied the extreme right with considerable distance
from other corps. On 25, August they reached the north of Ortelsburg.
1st corps in the left had taken train due to the fact that
their concentration position was in Warsaw nearby. They were
in the defensive position around Soldau. However, two of their
eight regiments remained inside the border because of flank protection
for newly mobilised 9th army concentrated in both Warsaw and
Nowogeorgiewsk. This caused problem of logistics and strength
when the battle actually happened.
On both 23 and 24, August 13th corps and 15th got contact
with German 20th corps(Scholtz)and repulsed Germans due to strength.
But Russians suffered greater loss than Germans. Scholtz retreated
10km and halted at narrow island-like area surrounded by three
lakes. It seemed easy to defend but hard to sally forth.
On 25, August Ludendorff caught up with military circumstance
of date. He visited the quarter of Francois in rear side of Soldau
to give orders with von Hindenburg. Von Hidenburg and Ludendorff
as well had known von Francois and his tendency very well. Ludendorff
gave orders to attack next day toward Usdau, though with ominous
presentiment.
Von Francois refused.
He rebuffed Ludendorff that his guns had not come yet because
of railway traffic congestion. That time refugees rushed to catch
trains causing confused diagram. As usual infantry had first
priority so that artillery troops and guns were delayed. He put
an emphasis on his meekness saying,
"I'll take any orders and attack. But without guns they
cannot but help rely on bayonets only. It may cause an inevitable
failure. Is it OK for you to fail to capture General Samsonv?"
Ludendorff stood up and told him to attack without saying
anything frustrated so much. When Ludendorff got on car Hoffman
handed decoded Russian wireless. It clearly said no movement
of Rennenkampf and Samsonov's order to dispose his corps tomorrow.
Those three could speak fluent Russian and easily grabbed the
meaning. Rennenkanmpf would not come and Samsonov were to change
his course from north-west to straight west.
On the same day, 3rd reserve division (von Morgen) arrived
at Allenstein. German defence line backed by three lakes was
strengthened considerably. From the east 17th corps(Mackenzen)
and 1st reserve corps reached 5km north of Bischofsburg.
On the other hand Russians were exhausted because of failure
of logistics and hard march. Jilinsky always asked to hurry up
on condition that the enemy retreated in rout with intention
to escape Russian pincer. This order was based on obedient assistance
posture to Paris. French asked to threaten Berlin at all cost.
If Russians successfully occupied East Prussia their distance
to Berlin would be 200km.
However, 2nd Army already marched 150km without roads and
foods. Russians changed the way of logistics from central control
to front control. Front control means that an quarter-master-general
of each corps with liaison officers from depot were given authorisation
to order for logistics troops. However, there had never been
tried any practice so that no one knew how to control logistics
troops.
Apparently, 2nd Army took a rest on this day not moving an
inch.
Continued to be the Second
