The Battle of Tannenberg (Second)

On 26,August in the morning a German reconnaissance aircraft sighted that a considerable force marched toward the north of Bischofsburg.

Ludendorff mentally broke down. If Rennenkampf's army cut in 8th army had no chance for survival. Better to withdraw?

Von Hindenburg was calm enough to stick to already disposed deployment. According to his memoir they could overcome the inward crisis.

At that time 17th corps of Mackenzen recovered supplemented by reservists but had continued to march for four consecutive days in forcible manner.

Around Lake Dedey on 26, August 1914

On the way to Bischofsburg they met 6th mixed territorial brigade which drew heavy and old fortress guns by half-starved horses and aged soldiers.

They traversed from east to west across the long column of 17th corps and von Mackenzen thought of this war now fought and inevitable human losses, and saw territorials off with hope for military luck.

Two hours later they suddenly encountered part of Russian 6th corps. Germans' strength was around twice but Russians fought very well because the soldiers were fresh. The balance of fighting was almost still with Germans exhausted. At that moment Russians collapsed without premonition and ran away.

From the opposite side of the lake old heavy guns of 6th mixed territorial brigade fired. This effect was devastating to Russians. 17th corps broke through and entered Bischofsburg.

1st reserve corps of von Below also crushed the rest of Russian 6th corps.

This day Russian 6th corps of Blagoveschchensky had received the report that cavalry sighted defeated soldiers marching from east to west and tried to contact with them. Defeated soldiers were estimated to be part of German 6th mixed territorial brigade. The Russians suffered so heavily that they retreated toward east or south almost in rout. Blagoveschchensky failed to grasp what happened to his corps unable to report until next noon on 27, August.

This battle played a decisive roll on the whole battle. On the same day Samsonv, commander in chief of Russian 2nd Army decided to take direct command on the fighting front and left Ostrolenka and arrived at Neidenburg in the evening. When 6th corps collapsed he did not change any operational plan to envelope by single wing German 20th corps turning from north.Allenstein Bygone Days

6th corps would not appear again till 30, August as an organised body. Samsonov once again ordered 13th, 15th and half of 23th corps to put more pressure to the German centre. 13th corps of Kliouev occupied Allenstein but went straight to west while to imagine that non-existing 6th corps was to come and hold to occupy it. Allenstein was nearest to Berlin while Russians tried to occupy it and to arrest Kaiser for the exile to St. Helena.

In the centre German defence strengthened but could not cope with constant pressure from Russians with incessant retreat and huge losses. 1st corps of von Francois was ordered to attack the left wing of 2nd army but did nothing except gradual 3km advance. This was perfect disobedience but von Francois brooded and waited for his timing.

When Samsonov took late evening meal with British observers soldiers on guard duty suddenly fled away without direct threat from the enemy. When an adjutant for Samsonv asked an officer in charge for comment he simply told of failures of logistics and no food for three days.

This evening German 8th army headquarters received another striking news. OHL(Oberste Heeresleitung; German Headquarters) announced three corps(two on the western front, one concentrated in Germany proper) would be sent to East Prussia for reinforcement. von Moltke junior, Germany's chief of general staff told later that occupation of Paris was meaningless if Berlin fell. Reasonable enough but unstrategic.

Ludendorff once worked as section chief of mobilisation in general staff. He knew everything necessary for execution of Schlieffen plan. He rebuffed that 3 corps were unnecessary and unable to be in time. But he was paralysed by being told that this had already been decided.

A general of France once told that von Moltke must report of this failure and impossibility to be equated with Great uncle, Moltke senior in front of his tomb.

It is hard to know whether this decision was a main factor of Marne or rather of the whole of the First World War. However, we are sure that Russian rapid advance caused von Moltke's confusion.

This late night artillery of von Francois was finally brought up. 8 o'clock in the morning on 28, August von Francois's timing was finally to come.The guns fired huge barrage on heads of Russian 1st corps that was expected to keep hold to the end. They held for three hours without protection because they really made trench in name but it was without any dug-out and communication trench. Russian manual for infantry stipulated that all infantry men should wait and hold until enemy artillery's ammunitions were exhausted. They did not change anything significant in manual since Napoleonic War. Russisn Trench near Usdau

Russians vanished in the position with half dead and the rest fleeing away.

Russians made a strange disposition followed by plan 19, their mobilisation plan. They practised war games over and over again. They feared about flank assault. While they concentrated 9th and 10th armies around Warsaw they disposed a quarter of 1st corps for defence against assault from west especially from Thorn fortress despite the fact that Germans emptied it and organised garrisons for the mixed brigade and replaced them by small folk-defence troops supplemented by school boys and girls.

However, the rest of 1st corps held and stopped successfully the advance of German 1st corps of von Francois shortly before Soldau.

In the east Germans were also exhausted. 17th corps and 1st reserve corps hardly marched only 20 km. 1st reserve arrived at Allenstein and 17th at Ortelsburg without fierce fighting.

This day Jilinsky found out that the situations were not so easy. However, he and Rennenkampf could not cancel their preoccupation that German main force was around Koenigsberg and did not speed 1st army's march up.

28, August in the Decisive Battlefield

On 28, August von Francois again gunfired Russian's position before Soldau. Russian soldiers who fought so bravely yesterday could not hold because their commander Altamonov scuffled inside the border.

In the east, arose a dispute between von Below and von Mackenzen on which road they were to take.

Both commanders were asked to succour the centre. Both wanted to take a would-be safer road, Bischofsburg-Allenstein boulevard. Ludendorff intervened to allow von Below to take that. Von Mackenzen's corps consisted of active soldiers only so that he gave way. However, this intervention gave crucial destiny to Russians. Because von Mackenzen took south-westernaly direction which was later changed to straight south, Willenberg. Russians lost way to escape by German occupation of Willenberg.

German Military Leaders on Lake Great Damerau
Left Standing by Telescope Is Hoffman

In the centre von Scholtz took an offensive to sally out through a narrow strait between two lakes. He failed losing 11000 which was largest casualties in number.

Ludendorff was terrified to have received the number. He pleaded von Francois to succour 20th corps with most earnest language,"If you follow this order you and your corps contribute most important service to the army."

Von Francois refused.

He took rather straight east direction not paying any consideration for the actual battle in the centre into account. He posted a machinegun squadron on each important intersection and before dawn on 29, August reached Willenberg.

Ludendorff was unhappy. He did not know where 17th corps and 1st reserve corps were , was disappointed with Scholtz's unsuccessful sally-out and out of all was upset by von Francois's disobedience.

But in the afternoon on 28, August inside his brain a brilliant idea flashed. If he asked von Mackenzen to march to Willenberg the envelopment was to complete. 17th corps's cavalry detachment also arrived at Willenberg in the early morning on 29, August.

Envelopment finished. In the morning of 28, August Samsonv still thought that if he held tight and continued to attack Rennenkampf came to succour and could defeat Germans by two armies. In the afternoon the sound of gunfire gradually approached Neidenburg. He realised that all things were in danger.

He asked British observers to go back to Warsaw and to leave right now with ominous presumption that the enemy was lucky this day.

Samsonov ordered the general retreat in the night. After that the battle of Tannenberg turned out to be annihilation of the entire army. 15th corps and 13th which fought longest and best had to retreat from the furthest. Germans awaited them with machine gun fire.

Only one officer out of all of 15th corps could return to safety. 1st corps with considerable fresh force counter-attacked and took Neidenburg again on 30, August to the vain. 6th also tried to take Ortelsburg but failed.

Destroyed Neidenburg

German took 92000 prisoners and killed 20000 or more. German dead and prisoners were less than 15000. Samsonov committed suicide near Wiilenberg. Germans found out his body and buried it. Two year later his widow retrieved it to Russia helped by Red Cross.

Rennenkampf clearly realised what happened to 2nd Army on 28, August. His advanced troops reached Bischofsburg and main force in Bartenstein. However, all were too late and after annihilation of 2nd Army he was also back to Angerapp line.

The First Battle of Masurian Lakes

Ludendorff received two corps, one for 11th corps and another for guard reserve corps. On 4, August he began to attack to the left wing of Russian 1st Army which were still inside the border. Von Francois's 1st corps lead off. Ludendorff thought of single envelopment that they would turn the Russian right and catch the centre back.

This plan was so simple and everyone could imagine it so easily that Russian headquarters(Stavka) sent newly organised 10th Army to protect the left of 1st Army. 10th army was commanded by Pflug who lost fighting spirit at a first sight of German fierce attack. Pflug brought all of his army back to the inside of the border.

As a result Germans broke through the Russian left at a moment with 30000 prisoners captured. Von Francois turned to the centre back.

Contrary to everyone's expectation Russians' defence was tight enough to repel all German attacks from two directions. This time von Francois did not have sufficient time to cut the Russian back off so, he threw his cavalry in. That was a disaster. The cavalry was destroyed completely before they approached Russian overnight sapped trench. German envelopment failed. Rennenkampf successfully withdrew outside the border with all of his army shaped like half-moon.

Rennenkampf

Germans captured 32000 prisoners for 10 days out of which 30000 were done for by von Francois's corps at the beginning. Second half of the battle showed that Rennenkampf was not so bad a general as was said. Germans pursued outside the border but were counter-attacked and withdrew.

epilogue

The whole battle of Tannenberg was fought up. This battle did not influence the important phase of the war in 1914. Russian were not so damaged due to the victory in Galicia. But German people were influenced.

The battle of Tannenberg was remembered not as its importance but as how Germans defeated Russians. Any time and in any countries people appreciates that inferior number of army defeats superior by feat of an ingenious commander. After the battle of Tannenberg the duo, Hindenburg and Ludendorff became heroes of their time.

In Russia the responsibility of the defeat went to Jilinsky. He was relegated to liaison officer for French headquarters living in Paris. It was said he was rather happy to take that position. French military personnel was perplexed because they could not question about Tannenberg not to offend him.

French military attache at Stavka showed great sympathy for casualties in Tannenberg and death of Samsonov. Grand Duke Nicholas replied that Russians were happy to have made such sacrifices for their allies. It was a remarkable reply by the top of world largest military body. Better to be an ally with Russia.

There still remains a great why.

Why did not Rennenkampf speed up to march to succour Samsonov?

Hoffman told this was because of vengeance between them. When in Russo-Japanese War both participated in the battle of Ryaoyan(Ryouyou). In Yentai(Endai) coal mining Rennenkampf, commander of a cavalry division almost fell into Japanese encirclement and asked Samsonov for help. But Samsonov refused and vengeance occurred between them. In the retreat battle at Mukden station a fist fight took place. Thus, Rennenkampf did not march.

This story is not true. After hearing of Hoffman's story Japanese general staff investigated the case. In the Ryaoyan battle Rennenkampf was in hospital because he was injured in the battle of Jaotao(Kyouto). It was Mischchenko who actually squabbled with Rennenkampf at Mukden station.

It almost appeared that Japanese army sent a spy inside the Russian Manchuria army headquarters. It did not mention about the source.

According to von Francois Rennenkampf was worried about his corps who caught them by surprise two times. Rennenkampf also misunderstood he was in Koenigsberg. He would challenge by siege battle so that Rennenkampf called up reserve divisions while waiting for a while.

Ludendorff put emphasis on deftness of German army. They managed manouver so skilfully that Russian failed to catch up with uptodate location of German army.

According to Japanese general staff Russians lacked or underestimated reconnaissance and overestimated war result of the battle of Gumbinenn.

Jilinsky belonged to Sukomulinov faction, Rennenkampf to Grand Duke Nicholas and Samsonov to neutrality. Russian generals appeared to think about how to dash a step from his comrade and promotion not to cooperate.

In this battle basic problems which appeared throughout The First World War had to be picked up.

    • Cavalry was useless. This was because the infantry's density was so thick and the firing range of rifles extended so much that it was impossible to approach infantry troops. The proportion of cavalry was high in Russian army.
    • Defence power was stronger than offence even in mobile warfare. Offence was only successful when taking enemy by surprise. But, after breakthrough infantry could march only on foot.
    • Railway system was extremely important. This means fighting in their own soil is advantageous.

Railway transportation can carry more gravity than any others on the ground. Russians did not forget this lesson. They were very successful in railway transportation in the entire period of WW2.

However, Japanese general staff took very strange a lesson.

Japanese General Staff and Envelopment Tactics

Back to Tannenberg First


Hoffmann, M. Tannenberg, wie es wirllich war, Berlin, 1925(tr.)The Truth about Tannenberg, London, 1929
Ludendorff, E. Kriegserinnerungen, Berlin, 1919
Francois, General Hermann von, Marneschlacht und Tannenberg, Berlin, 1920
Ironside, Major-General Sir E. Tannenberg: The First Thirty Days in East Prussia, Edinnburgh, 1925
Knox, Major-General Sir E. With the Russian Army, London, 1921
Japanese General Staff Tannenberg-Annihilation Battle 1928

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