In winter of 1917 all was quiet on the western front. It snowed little so that soldiers in trench were more comfortable than previous three winters. Except patrol and skirmish afterwards nothing important happened everyday.

The Allied acquired a new comer, US in April, 1917. But their soldiers were not at front yet. All front except the western was called the East. The Allied war record in the East in 1917 was disappointing except Palestine. Russia dropped out and Italy almost lost fighting spirit by the terrible defeat at Caporetto and only Anglo-Franco aids sustained their war efforts.

However, the British moral was high despite past three year's losses. The French were exhausted but knew what the defeat meant to them.

On the other hand the Central powers except Germany began to lose their cause to fight despite the victory over Russia. To Austria=Hungary and Turk as well their main enemy was Russia, neither Great Britain or France. To Bulgaria their main enemy was Serbia which already lost their whole territory in 1916. These three countries lost cause except vague faith in German victory.

It was apparent even to the Germans that they fight against big three singlehanded. German soldiers fought very well on the Western front. In the previous year Germans suffered 850 thousand human loss. But, the Allied lost 145 thousand. When taking the number, 3 million on German front into account this might be good for record. Only 300 thousand were killed. Ludendorff could have been successful in his retreating operation.

However, this success accompanied with strange effects. Half of front line German soldiers had fought since the outbreak of the War. As for British or French soldiers this percentage was less than 10. German soldiers were well experienced but haggard in the war.

Due to the stoppage of the eastern front 2 million half of front line solders could be transferred to the western. This began November, 1917. As a result they deployed full 192 divisions on the western front.

The Allied had 161 divisions including Belgian 6, American 6 and Portuguese 2. However, British and French divisions were short to the full by 18%. But, British and American divisions were so-called 4 unit which meant that each one had 4 regiments and each regiment had 4 battalions. In total German superiority was around 20% in this winter. It was also easily imagined that this German superiority on quantity was soon passing because US had announced to send 1 million to Europe a year.

Ludendorff continued to refuse compromised peace. Precisely speaking, he insisted on German supremacy over militarily acquired area. The absolute cause of the Allied was recovery of Belgium. In this light Germany failed to clarify their cause itself to others because they once announced their invasion to Belgium came from military necessity not from the objective itself. A year later no military German leaders would say about Belgium which they were persistent in so much.

Probably, Ludendorff wanted absolute military victory. He was an artisan in military matters, not any more. German tragedy simply came from this simple fact. If well informed no Germans were object to compromised peace without Belgium. They lost only a chance to make compromised peace in late 1917. If peace realised, there would be no a second world war or if happened it would take completely different shape.

On 11 November, 1917 at a general staff conference Ludendorff blurred, "We must defeat the British, our arch-enemy first before the Americans send sizable number of troops on the western front. Then, we can concentrate on lone French." The Kaiser and even Hindenburg did not join this meeting. Germany dropped into military dictatorship.

His strategy was to break through somewhere of British line and reach the British channel to sever the connection between British and French. The penchant for movement battle was clear and in this light he was rather an older type of military leader than Seekt, Brusilov or Petain.

Ludendorff's Original Plan

Paying respect for recently stiffening William the Second, Ludendorff named this prospective battle as Kaiser's battle after him.

Ludendorff, however, were flexible to adopt new way to break through called Hutier tactics. This tactics was so successful at Caporetto that the Central almost annihilated Italians approaching to Venice. This method needed to train infantrymen and its characteristics was to have many storm troops to infiltrate the enemy advanced trench and to turn to take the back of front line soldiers. The basic method was the same as Brusilov's, but Ludendorff did not take area attack, but rather preferred point attack.

The artillery expert, Bruchmueller took the command of all artillery. New weapons were also introduced. Firstly, portable machine guns were provided for storm troops. Secondly, light trench motors were for direct assistance troops. All infantry men carried nothing but a single infantry weapon and a few grenade. Mobility was valued first. The Allied only adopted this in the Final Offensive.

To conform this method special elite troops were created: three guard divisions recruited only in Prussia, Hanover Gibraltar division, Kinder Molt( Death of the Innocent )corps, and so on.

Since late 1917 Ludendorff ordered to make the first advanced trench thin. The number of soldiers in advanced trench was less than one third of the peak. It may take some interests that the French also took the same method under the order of Petain at least in appearance. French called this the offensive defence, which later stifled Hutier tactics. Japanese soon followed. In Red Army this was expanded and reorganised for many subjects and then was called depth tactics which became popular in US.

On opposite side the British accepted the enlargement of defence area. Gough, commander of 5th army was in charge for the area to be attacked. However, Lloyd-George, prime minister was hesitant to send more troops to France shocked by enormous list of casualties in the third battle of Ypre. Most of divisions were 75% to the full.

The British had already took some notice of potential attack but could not know when and how. Haig took alarm and put more divisions to north. 5th army weakened but was expected to receive French assistance at the time of emergency.

The First Drive (21 March ; code name Michaelis)

German great offensive commenced. After bombardment by 6 thousand guns of all types for 5 hours German storm troops rushed forward at 930. On the first day of the offensive Gough's 5th army was crushed and then retreated with 20 thousand captured. But they did not run back in rout and held tight with rear guard advancing on a few occasions. On the opposite Hutier's 18th army and Marwitz's 2nd were organised to pursue. There to the right Below' 17th army attacked but faced with difficulty. British Byng's 3rd army held tight against German storm.

German 4th and 18th advanced at high speed fighting and destroying British 5th with German right, 17th army halting. As a result the farther they advanced the wider became the shape of their formation. Eventually the direction of advancing turned towards Paris. It was a fatal mistake to no purpose even if they acquired the triangular real estate.

The French, in particular chief of General staff Petain was alarmed he immediately sent his strategic reserves to defend Paris, not to save British 5th. On their turn the British begged Petain to succour. This was done with inevitable frictions.

The Germans in the battle field felt pleased to find Paris in their direction. They went forward quickly for five or six days and stopped with food and ammunition running out. The direct assistance groups could not catch up with because they were constantly under bombardment from British rear with no fear of friendly fire. All suddenly stopped and even German storm troops began to dig trench.

Dense formation itself was a problem attracting shells and its mobility was limited by foot. The Germans repeated this five times successively in this battle leaving triangular shaped devastated land, unnecessary salient. However, it was for the first time that 40 miles front was broken on the western front.

On 25 March Big Bertha or Paris gun was completed for firing 75 Km west from Paris. It weighed 138 tons with the length of the barrel 30m which was the largest human beings had ever built. On that day 6 shells fell down to Paris with 16 dead. Parisians were not panicked, rather glared their fighting spirit.

By 28 March on all front German advance stopped. It was clear that the operation Michaelis failed to attain the objective set before. Ludendoff gave up the further advance and decided to try another at a different point.

The Second Drive (9 April ; code name Georg und Mars )

Ludendorff could not stop the offensive so that the next point to attack should be chosen. He rather appreciated weaker points for these offensives. Portuguese two divisions held the line around R. Lys. They were not trained well and depressed without cause specilized for their homeland. When presaged by four hours and half intensive bombardment the Germans, 6th army commanded by Quast went over the top all Portuguese ran away with their trench empty and Germans exploited and walked over three miles. There, they met the British who were standing with their bayonet laying flat , no cover, eyes red. Plumer, commander of British 2nd army determined never to pass any Germans through. Both fought without trench and any cover. But the British could enjoy bombardment to German rear.

Next day Ludendorff sent 4th army commanded by Arnim for reinforcement. The British retreated to set up a new defence line around Armentieres. Haig alarmed by the situation asked soldiers to hold the position to the last fighting man. The British fought well in defensive. Germans stopped on the whole front.

On 18 April French strategic reserves arrived at Kemmel hill where they could look over the whole battlefield. They rather overwhelmed the German tired storm troops. The crisis was over. On 24 April German 17th army tried to break through at opposite point to get to Amiens but failed. This was the final attempt to sever the line between British and French.

The Third Drive (27 May ; code name Bluecher )

At this stage Ludendorff understood his strategic failure. Men are not faster runners than locomotives on railway. Even though he pushed all assistance troops or local and strategic reserves available into the line the Allied reserves arrived faster and knew where Germans were.

He could not improve infantrymen's legs. 22 years later Hitler put impossible dream, mobile warfare into reality by the force of Armoured divisions. Hitler, on this Second offensive belonged to Below's 17th army and for direct assistance troops in front of British 3rd army (Byng).

However, Ludendorff decided to hold offensive posture. In this Third the target was Paris.
1st army(Mdra) and 7th army(Boem) poised for attack to 6th army(Duchene). The Germans went over the top at 340 meeting with minimum resistance at Chemin des Dames, which was the old battle field of Nivelles offensive.

Luck favoured Ludendorff once again. Duchene committed a fatal mistake to have the first line trench thick. German storm troops easily broke through at many points and turned back to capture front line soldiers. Duchene had few local reserves to prevent it. Germans advanced 30 miles for three days, record of a kind. Ludendorff dreamt of capturing Paris herself.

That day dream was a fatal mistake to him. Because the broken line was not enough for all assistance troops to advance. The shape of the salient was triangular as before. The result was that Germans had to defend longer line than before.

Foch thought it over. He concluded that this offensive was against the principle of German offensive. Long before he judged the aim of German offensive to sever the Allied defence line around Amiens. He correctly imagined Germans were declining in strategic reserves. He waited, for a while, to send his strategic reserve allowing Germans to advance deeply.

After French withdrew Americans suddenly appeared at Chateau Thierry, the corner of Ludendorff's triangle. Americans fought fiercely, which the contemporary people had hardly imagined. On 2 June the Germans crossed the Marne as Kluck's 1st army four years ago. Four days before the Kaiser appeared at California Look-out to look over Paris where he approached to the never-seen city closest in his life.

The German striking forces attacked for 6 days in row. French strategic reserves arrived to take positions to contain Germans from both sides. They reoccupied German bridgehead of the Marne and repulsed. All German offensive front began to tremble.

The Fourth Drive (8 June ; code name Gneizenau )

Alarmed by Chateau Thierry salient in poor condition Ludendorff tried to join two salients. He ordered 18th army(Hutier) to turn to the left to join 1st army Mdra.

This was so a simple method that the French easily perceived what the fourth offensive was all about. The battle continued fiercely but this time the French took advantage. On 11 June French strategic reserves commanded by Mangin counter attacked by the method called drill charge without any preparatory bombardment. They broke through at every German front in Chateau Thierry salient.

The French advanced like a big falchion with their flank protected by tanks. Artillery men simultaneously went ahead with their field guns, 75s pulled by man-power.

The whole German defensive trembled down. The French advanced 5 miles a day capturing thousands of German soldiers.

In mid-June another epidemic called Spanish influenza struck both sides. This was devastating. US army lost more lives by this than actually killed in action. The Germans could not but to halt the offensive. However, they were so shocked by this decease that the only hope rather laid in the victory on the front.

On 24 June Kuehlmann, German Secretary of State publicly mentioned of the compromise peace. Ludendorff lost his nerve and insisted on his replacement. The Kaiser obeyed and Kuehlmann was forced to retire.

The Fifth Drive ( 14 July : code name Marne)

Ludendorff ordered the offensive around Reims in the midnight of 14 July. The French noticed this beforehand. Petain put the offensive defence into action in thoughtful manner. French front trench was turned into decoy lightly manned.

The Germans destroyed this decoy by bombardment and then started to advance. Ludendorff assembled more than fifty divisions to break through. After marching a few miles they faced the real defence line.

Douglas MacArthur, future commander in chief of the Allied in Eastern theatre during WW2 later wrote that when they met the dikes of our real line they were exhausted, uncoordinated, and scattered incapable of going on and he was haunted by the vision of those writhing bodies hanging from the barbed wire.

The Germans concentaratd their efforts to break through at Chateau Thierry by 7th army (Boem) and 1st army (Mdra). But, the offensive lasted for only three days. However, they advanced 5 miles and crossed the Marne again. It was apparent that Germans could not hold the bridgehead without reinforcement.

On the other hand, French 10th army(Mangin) and American two divisions counter attacked along the Aine since 17 July. Ludendorff ordered 7th army (Boem) to withdraw abandoning the bridge head. The Kaiser's battle finished and German march homeward began.

In this battle Germans were estimated to lose 960 thousand and British 450 thousand, French 490 thousand. The loss ratio was around even. However, Germans lost their first-line troops. French loss was light and British loss was heavy but they still hold their reserves in their islands. Americans cried out they could send three million by next year.

This battle was a fault of Ludendorff. He could not recover from this failure. His dream was to envelop and annihilate British. He never realised the limitation of infantry on mobility.