Brusilov offensive was the only battle which was named after
the individual field commander and was successful in the First
World War.
Brusilov offensive played rather larger roll in history than
imagined. In Germany the duo von Hindenburg and Ludendorff took
reign on military affairs replacing Falkenhayn and later became
military dictators. It was the start of desperate Germany, which
to be continued until 1992, the virtual end of twentieth century.
Brusilov
By the military defeat Austria=Hungry seemed impossible to
be by anyone including Habsburg princes. And then, Romanov dynasty
was seen as being an hindrance to the nation and the people.
Even military leaders thought Romanov family did harm to Russian
war efforts and people's welfare.
Russians had recovered since the great retreat forced by Gorlice
break through. Japanese shipped more than one million Arisaka
rifles. All soldiers were fully equipped. There were still short
of shells but Japanese also sent trench mortars which were very
useful in the offensive.
In the beginning of 1916 the front line was almost straight
from Riga to Czernowitz near the Dniester. Under the direct command
of Nicholas the Second three "Fronts" were established.
North-western Front(Kurobatkin), Western Front(Evert) and South-western(Ivanov-Brusilov)
Front. This Kurobatkin was a loser of the battle of Mukden. All
except aged Russian generals felt doubtful of this appointment.
But this was a tip of the whole iceberg. Altamonv who scuffled
from the position crucial for survival of 2nd army in Tannenberg
was really appointed as fortress commander of Przemysl. French
military observer took it as a joke.
The Battle of Lake Narotch
Russians faced with French pressure which strengthened day
by day by German offensive in Verdun. Nicholas the Second could
not refuse Russian whole-hearted help. Russians made two prong
of an offensive jointly by Kurobatkin's Front and Evert's in
March 1916 mainly near Lake Narotch. Germans were well informed
of this offensive.
Kurobatkin who replaced Ruzski, a boneless procrastinated
fighter insisted on night attack. He added that combination between
bayonets and search light would have revolutionary effects on
trench warfare. Search light would make Germans dazzled and Russian
fighting spirit would overwhelm German machine guns. They actually
tried it. Search light rather silhouetted Russian soldiers and
machine gun bullets awaited them. Kurobatkin had been tormented
by Japanese night attack during Russo-Japanese War and then wanted
Germans afflicted with the same.
Japanese really attacked Russians in the night while all troops
were moving. Japanese did not when the enemy put themselves for
defensive posture in trench. Weather also stood for Germans.
March sunshine melted down iced ground and then turned it into
churned mud.
All Russian attacks consumed million of shells. German trench
was constructed well with communication trench and dug-outs.
They killed five Russians with every one German lost. It was
the worst record for the offence in the First World War.
Both commanders perfectly lost fighting spirit. In trench
warfare offensives were impossible, they thought.
Chief of general staff, Alexeyev summoned three Front commanders
on 14, April. Because French asked Russians for help while the
battle of Verdun was at peak. Kurobatkin and Evert refused saying
the disadvantage of the offence.
Brusilov told that he could attack in Summer and not necessarily
be reinforced with both manpower and fire. According to Brusilov's
memoir Kurobatkin looked at him in pity and shrugged shoulders.
Brusilov was told to go ahead. But in reality no one out of three
expected Brusilov to do something.
Brusilov was born in a rich and militarily oriented family.
His wife was a cousin of both Stolypin (former prime minister)
and Isbolsky (former foreign minister). He had been in the established
world and became one of the greatest field commanders whom Russia
and The First World War produced. After the war he joined Red
Army and became Inspection-General. In his mind the loyalty to
fatherland is not contradictory with joining Red Army.
South-Western Front produced more able officers later belonging
to Red Army. The more able soldiers are the more passionate to
join Red army. It is reasonable enough for the Red to defeat
the White. Even this time, summer in 1916 they seemed to be willing
to get apart from Tsar and his regime.
There were a lot of reasons why the offence was so disadvantageous
during the First World War. And the ideas to solve these problems
were themselves contradictory. For an instance if the offence
wants to take the defence by surprise it is very difficult to
accumulate a considerable quantity of ammunitions in secrecy.
Furthermore if they begin bombardment for preparation it automatically
teach that the attack is coming. On the other hand apart from
flat understandings it is not difficult for well trained and
devoted small troops to breach the first trench. The problem
is to hold occupied positions.
It is almost impossible for advanced troops to get assistance
bombardment except when accompanied by well trained and enough
mobile artillery. And it sometimes happens they are cross fired
from left, right and front. Because they are in the salient they
themselves build.
And also it is a decisive factor that the defence can call
up strategic reserves by train. The attackers are on the outer
line with no availability of train resulting in running or walking
on foot. Then, the defence wins successfully.
In order to solve this bottle-neck von Mackenzen carried ammunitions
and reinforced soldiers in secrecy, selected the area which Russians
would fight for to the end and and attacked with guns and bayonet
alternately until all Russians vanished. He did not care about
the speed of march and human losses.
It was impossible for Brusilov to take this tactics.
First of all he did not have enough shells. And then if he
had it was not easy to knock out German or Austrian trench. Even
if he did he would lose surprise of attack. He solve these questions
by follows.
These tactics were all epoch-making. Germans as well as French
copied all of these or part of. Some war critics think British
failed in the Somme and Passchendaele because they did not take
these lessons.
Russians made preparation with enough caution which they were
not good at in usual cases. They constructed large dug-outs called
Platsd'armee. This would serve to accommodate large number of
strategic reserve troops. They also sapped one more line of trench
which would be a spring-board for storm-troops.
It took only one month to finish. Brusilov thought the preparation
was over.
The formation of south-western front was as follows.
8th corps ; Kaledin
11th corps ; Lechitski
7th corps ; Shcherbachev
9th corps ; Sakhanov
Brusilov's subordinate commanders except Sakhanov did not
support this newly developed idea that was too different from
the precedents.
Shcherbachev once studied in France and liked everything French.
The French naturally did not mention about these new methods.
Lechitski always blamed something since his birth and complained
of shortage of shell. Kaledin was a chieftain of Don Cossack
and had full fighting spirit but no more.
The offensive was planned as four corps would attack more
than 30km width each. South-eastern Front was about 600 thousand
soldiers strong. And the opposite Austrian Army was 500 thousand.
Russian strength was not overwhelming but even. Alexeyev thought
that Russians had failed in several offensives though they attacked
against shorter front lines and with larger forces, and therefore
this plan was impossible to succeed.
However, Alexeyev could not oppose this plan to the end because
Italians desperately asked for help. They faced with an Austrian
offensive in South Tyrol (Trentino) and lost with 80000 casualties
dead or captured and all ammunitions consumed. They told that
if Austrians broke through to North Italian Plain their main
force on the Isonzo might lose their back and be destroyed in
total.
South Tyrol is a mountainous area and Italians deployed their
alpine riflemen in the height. Valleys there were U-shaped and
Austrians got through in the bottom of valleys. Though the position
high is advantageous, Italians were located on too high positions.
They were impossible to shoot with scopes useless and fired bullets
unseen. They surrendered on the mountain tops in hordes.
Alexeyev once refused. However, King of Italy pleaded with
homage to Russian Empire and Tsar. Joffre also asked for help
suggesting this time the offensive to Austrians. At last, Italians
alluded compromised peace and the possibility that all of Austrian
forces must turn to Russians.
Alexeyev gave way. He could not be for Brusilov but the other
two Front commanders had no idea for offensives and had no stomach
to fight. He once again asked Brusilov to change his plan especially
about the width of attack. Brusilov refused confidently.
Brusilov Offensive
Alexeyev issued an order on 31, May that a powerful auxiliary
attack upon Austrians would deliver in advance, then the main
attack by all Western Front would follow.
The auxiliary attack would succeed beyond any expectation
concerned.
The attack began with 5 hours preparatory bombardment on 4,
June. This bombardment spread out the whole South-western Front
and the main target was not clear at this stage.
Austrian's trench was well constructed with three lines and
1km depth. The first trench line had dug-outs sometimes with
windows.
In the afternoon of the day, Russian storm troops broke through
the first trench line without paying any attention to the soldiers
there and then advanced to the second and the third.
It was very easy for them to take the first because Russian
sapped advanced trench close to Austrian's. Russians casually
walked over. Kaledin succeeded to break through at 51 points
on the day.
Then, strategic reserves followed. All over the front Russian
storm troops reached the third, so all depth. Austrian soldiers
in the first line of trench were in dug-outs. Infiltration of
storm troops was so fast and Russian bombardment so accurate
and incessant that they were surrounded by Russians before manning
machine gun posts.
Russians successfully broke through at so many points Austrians
were unable to manoeuvre strategic reserves. Two divisions of
strategic reserves cruised in back side areas and could not reach
any battlefields in time.
German chief of general staff von Falkenhayn recorded of the
days.
Received the voice of Austrians for help on 4, June.
"Russian forces under General Brusilov attacked the
day before all fronts from Lutsk on the Styr around the bent
near Koryn to the border of Romania. After comparatively small
bombardment infantry went over our trench and advanced casually.
At a few points they organised attacking battalions. It should
not be said as an offensive but be called reconnaissance by force.
It was also easily imagined that they would like to verify loyalty
by doing something for their ally, Italians."
Despite an optimistic Austrian view the situation turned
out to be critical in a few days. That might be effective to
the weak armed forces though the offensive was mere reconnaissance.
General Brusilov's decision was quite correct.
In the east of Lutsk Russians broke through into the centre
front of Austrians. In two days they lost a 50km front. Austrian
4th army was annihilated except a few. In Bukovina Austrian 7th
army was in critical situation and retreated. It was clear enough
that Galicia faced crisis.
Austrian 4th army (Arc Duke Ferdinand) damaged most severely
out of all with more than 50000 captured. Most of the prisoners
had been in dug-outs and were captured without fierce fighting.
When officers of 4th army called up only 27000 out of 150000
answered. It should be said as annihilation recorded by Falkenhayn.
Russian 8th army (Kaledin) advanced rapidly. On 7, June They
occupied Lutsk. To the south 11th army occupied Dubno and got
Austrian strategic reserves over in mobile warfare.
To the further south 7th army did not do well. As being Francophil
he did not take the Front headquarters' orders and his artillery
continued bombardment for two days. Receiving the warning in
the opposite Suedearmee (German South Army) held tight. Russians
failed with 20000 casualties.
It was often said that Suedarmee repulsed Russians because
German soldiers were not weak unlike Austrian. It is not true
because soldiers of Suedarmee were Austrians not Germans. In
the original Suedarmee were established by German 4 divisions.
Then, these 4 were extracted to the western front replaced by
Austrians despite the commander who was a German Bethomar successively.
To the south end 9th army(Sakhanov : later CinC of the Danube
Army) got a brilliant success.
Here, Pflanzer-Baltin who was one of the most ingenious commanders
in Austria=Hungary kept hold in well constructed trench. And
his army, 7th was most solid and well-equipped. However, these
advantages did not work faced with Russian new tactics. Though
Pflanzer-Baltin had built several strong holds which shaped like
a salient or bridge-head, Sakhanov's soldier did not care about
strong points but infiltrate at many weak points. Russians broke
through in Galicia.
Pflanzer-Baltin reported on 10, June that he lost more than
100 thousands soldiers all at once.
Brusilov also reported about captured guns and prisoners on
12, June. According to this, he captured 190 thousands out of
whom 2992 were officers, 216 guns and 645 machine guns. Furthermore,
this was believed to underestimate the result.
Austrians lost this huge loss in a week south from Pripet
marshes where 500 thousands soldiers had existed before the offensive.
These are breath-taking numbers.
However, one week later Brusilov lost next targets. From the
beginning he did not have strategic targets except for Austrian
field army. Lutsk and Dubno were perfect Russian cities. In this
light he already attained the geographical goals. The fact was
very simple. By his methods he could knock out the field army
by capturing it if they concentrated in front trench. But he
could not gain real estate in such a short term. Infantry had
to move on foot as having been since men took weapons.
Brusilov also did not have reserves because they were used
up by direct assistance for storm troops. No cavalry except Mannerheim's
who was to be leader of Finnish independence and a wartime hero
in Winter War fought in 1939-1940 and 1943-1944. But Russian
soldiers confident in victory were active in July throughout
pursuing reinforced Germans and Austrians.
But, going on late summer logistics extended to the full.
And Brusilov advanced to turn around Pripet marshes for pivot.
He felt necessary for flank protection against the enemy coming
from the north.
Brusilov expected North-western Front and Western Front to
attack at this stage to erase the south of Pripet marshes salient.
Naturally, both Evert and Kurobatkin did not have any stomach
to attack even if both had more than one million armies.
Brusilov had never made any clear presentation on any of his
methods. In his memoir he criticised his comrades and evaluated
his subordinates. But, mystically enough he did not mention of
his methods. He might think it was militarily confidential or
he might be a typical Russian gentleman. To complain and derogate
is OK but not to boast. In reality it was impossible to expect
both doing something.
Alexeyev made a decision to send troops over under the command
of Brusilov. Brusilov was dismayed because he did not have any
idea to use this reinforcement. Brusilov's methods were to take
the enemy by surprise, to infiltrate in the wide area and to
level their heads. If he got reinforcement he had to find out
the enemy concentrated and to prepare something for attack.
The Battle of Kowel
Brusilov brought the reinforcement, the Guard army (commanded
by Bezobrazov, who was almost senile and knew nothing about staff
work according to Brusilov's memoir) into the battle of Kowel.
Linsingen group, half Germans and half Austrians kept hold around
the city.
So far Brusilov lost more than 125 thousand, huge losses but
not so much compared to Austrian losses 350 thousand. However,
this number does not include the injured. Russians suffered more
than 300 thousand injured. Staggering, indeed. Brusilov's methods
allowed almost all soldiers to engage the battle. In this light
the number of the injured cannot but help to increase.
We can not know whether this number caused Brusilov to change
his methods. In reality the battle of Kowel was quite different
from the battle fought in previous 5 weeks.
Apparently, Brusilov tried to turn Linsingen group's right
and take the back while Western Front advanced to the centre.
But, Evert, commander of Western Front lost fighting spirit despite
the order from Stavka (Russian headquarters). As a result Russians
attacked repetitively toward the same direction.
In July Conrad, chief of Austrian general staff broke off
the South Tyrol offensive and pull full 5 divisions off to the
east. And Falkenhayn also sent 7 division for the reinforcement.
Central power's reinforcement was mainly sent to the south,
Galicia or Bukovina where Russians had the momentum for triumph
pursuing Germans and Austrians.
Russians enjoyed almost two times numerical superiority at
the moment. But in the battle of Kowel fought by old methods
numbers were nothing like the battle of Lake Narotch.
The battle continued from late July to full August. Both armies
stood on the River Stokhod, small and shallow river. Preobrajenski
regiment ,Semenovski and Ismailovski all of which were sung in
as Russian flower charged to the vain. Austrians held off.
10, October Nicholas the Second officially announced the offensive
was called off. Thus, the last and great victory in the battlefield
of Imperial Russia ended up.
Nicholas the Second visited Brusilov's headquarters
with his son in autumn of 1916.
What was caused by Brusilov offensive?
An British observer, Knox (later major-general) underestimated
Brusilov's methods with little intelligence over battlefields
despite his impressive literature and exaggerated Russian losses.
He mentioned Russia suffered more than one million human loss
by Brusilov offensive. But in reality this number included those
of the battle of Lake Narotch and Rumanian campaign. Russia suffered
more than 1.4 million human loss in 1916 in total. But if compared
with previous records even this number is very successful. Both
in1914 and 1915 Russians suffered more than two million human
losses.
It is arguable whether 1916's human loss is the first cause
of Russian Revolution. Although, it is true that able officers
felt Tsar system as ineffective to maintain Russian war efforts.
Rumanians decided to side with the Allied. Austrian forces
vanished piecemeal. Even on platoon level German officers took
the command. Falkenhayn was replaced by Hindenburg with Ludendorff,
Quarter-Master-General. French ascended to euphoria over the
western front with "Victory over Germans at Verdun."
Tsar entrusted his wife, Tsarina Alexandra with all internal
affairs in his vast territory. This tradition had been maintained
from the era of Ekaterina. Tsarina was looked as a German by
the public because she was a princess of the Dukedom of Hesse-Darmstadt.
She was also rumoured to be under influence of Grigory Rasputin.
He claimed to be one of the finest Starlets (Christian monk)
and to be able to cure haemophiliac which her only son, heir
apparent to Tsar suffered.
When Romanov family was persecuted by the Red there were none
even in the White who insisted on being royalists. It is probable
in the days of Brusilov offensive that people had nothing like
belief in Tsar even if he was a virtual ecclesiastical leader
of Russian society. He had never implemented any serious changes
in politics and appointments of senior bureaucrats passed into
Tsarina's hand or her abhorrent advisor, Rasputin's. It might
be a miracle in twentieth century that such a anachronistic regime
remained.
Brusilov offensive is a remarkable achievement also in military
history. Germans took lessons and adopted infiltration tactics
in the Kaiser's Battle which was to be called Hutier tactics
by the Allied soldiers. Petain and Foch took wide area tactics
using tanks in stead of storm troops in the Final Offensive..
This tactics hid itself as secret teachings in inter-war period.
Japanese took it wholeheartedly because they hated to be taken
for prisoners. Japanese had fought guerrilla war in mainland
China where old Chinese war rules controlled. Belligerents had
never taken prisoners.
In Japanese Imperial army, being taken for a prisoner meant
forced death or suicide. It seemed to them that this tactics
might decrease war prisoners whatever the other damages arose.
Japanese army trained all conscripted soldiers to be squad members
of storm troops.
The first test was tried in Shanghai at the beginning of Sino-Japanese
war. Von Seekt, chief of general staff of Weimar Republic constructed
a trench line with considerable depth around Shanghai. This trench
was called Seekt line. However, numerically inferior Japanese
Imperial Army defeated Chinese army (National Party) on Seekt
line in a week inflicting more than 150 thousand loss in October
1937. It is sometimes said that Chinese soldiers were not equipped
with modernised weapons or their moral was not high. These were
not true. Chinese soldiers were war seasoned and equipped with
Czech or Skoda made weapons. Except air force Chinese had better
weapons than Japanese. This battle was one of the best examples
of the validity of Brusilov's methods.
In Soviet Russia Brusilov's methods were systematised into
depth tactics. It should be noted that Red army advanced with
all their heads levelled in the final phase of WW2.
46 years later, Sadam Hussein, Iraqi dictator constructed
depth trench line covering the whole area of Kuwait under the
guidance of Soviet Russian advisers when the Gulf War occurred.
That trench system was completely in vain when faced with US
computer weapons. The depth defence and the offensive defence
which enabled the defence to invalid Brusilov's methods were
both invented in the beginning of twentieth century and faded
away into oblivion shortly before the century comes to an end.